The Dynamics of Oscillation between the Self and the Representation: The Construction of Female Subjectivity in Augusta Websters Dramatic Monologue Form by Kim Seonoh
The Dynamics of Oscillation between the 
Self and the Representation:
The Construction of Female Subjectivity in Augusta 
Webster’s Dramatic Monologue Form
Seonoh Kim
Ever since the genre’s initial introduction in the field of literary criti-
cism, establishing a set of definitive features for the dramatic monologue 
has been at best elusive. Nevertheless, despite the failure of forming a 
consensus on its definition, the “umbrella term ‘dramatic monologue’,” 
(69) as Cornelia Pearsall explains, has held its practical usefulness in 
literary criticism. “What, then, might be the use of a generic term, and 
specifically, how does the umbrella term ‘dramatic monologue’ contrib-
ute to our reading of these poems?” (69): Pearsall’s question makes an 
insightful suggestion on the nature of the dramatic monologue that, 
instead of burying oneself in the problem of how to define the dramatic 
monologue or which poem qualifies as one, it might be much more pro-
ductive to make an inquiry on what kind of effects the genre creates, 
and what its implications might be. The earliest and arguably the most 
influential attempt in this has been that of Robert Langbaum, who has 
suggested the “combination of sympathy and judgment” (91) aroused 
in the reader’s mind is the unique effect of the dramatic monologue. 
However, recent criticism on the genre is addressing the limitations in 
Langbaum’s frame of analysis, producing valid new observations on the 
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effects and significance of the dramatic monologue as well as widening 
the literary canon of the genre; namely, the dramatic monologue as the 
interplay between self and context which inevitably serves as a social 
critique. In this revisionist approach to the genre, the (re)discovery of 
the women writers’ dramatic monologue has claimed a key position in 
developing critical discussion.
This essay mainly analyzes Augusta Webster’s “The Happiest Girl in 
the World” focusing on the elaborate interplay between the female sub-
ject and the patriarchal society containing her. The female speakers in 
Portraits dramatize their incompliance with the contemporary Victorian 
ideology as they problematize and interrogate the cultural representa-
tions of women, including the prevalent social discourse on the “prob-
lem” of the redundant woman and the fallen woman. However, their 
monologues do not constitute a simple diagram of the self against the 
oppressive society. Whereas each speaker articulates her anxiety, frus-
tration, and even critical awareness against the patriarchal ideology, 
she also delineates her susceptibility to the discursive representation as 
her speech betrays her internalized sentiments and desires inculcated 
by the very social norms she strives to resist. The female self repudiates 
the prevailing representations on the female, but the repudiated rep-
resentation is revealed to be indivisible from the self. Webster’s female 
speakers oscillate between contradictory, ambivalent positions of defy-
ing and conforming to the social ideology, maintaining an unstable divi-
sion in their self-image. Nonetheless, although each speaker is denied 
of socioeconomic breakthrough, it might be misleading to conclude alto-
gether that their monologue eventually comes to a weary standstill. It is 
the dynamism of the oscillation that the speaker’s performance finally 
dramatizes: rather than a pessimistic vision toward any social change, 
each monologue demonstrates a critical understanding of the relation-
ship between the self and the social discourse.
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“The Umbrella Term ‘Dramatic Monologue’”
Early criticisms on the dramatic monologue made efforts to create a 
set rubric for the genre based on the formal features of some of Robert 
Browning’s poetry. However, opposing the critical practice of making an 
“exclusive concern with objective criteria” (71) based on the “mechanical 
resemblance,” (71) Robert Langbaum, in his influential criticism, has 
suggested instead “we consider its effect, its way of meaning,” (71-72) 
focusing instead on the genre’s effect on the reader. According to Lang-
baum, the dramatic monologue is distinctive in that “we understand 
the speaker of the dramatic monologue by sympathizing with him, and 
yet by remaining aware of the moral judgment we have suspended for 
the sake of understanding” (91). Langbaum assigns the “combination 
of sympathy and judgment” (91) aroused in the reader as the dramatic 
monologue’s unique capability. Although Langbaum’s analysis has been 
prevalent in the understanding of the genre, a recent body of criticisms 
on the dramatic monologue has pointed out the limitations of his criti-
cism and seeks to define the effects of the genre from different perspec-
tives. For example, Cynthia Scheinberg raises a fundamental question 
on Langbaum’s idea of the “sympathy and judgment.” She comments 
Langbaum has made a tacit assumption that a reader’s response to a 
poem would be essentially universal and identical. Rereading Lang-
baum’s criticism on the dramatic monologue from a feminist perspective, 
Scheinberg points out that “a reader’s capacity for sympathy is almost 
always linked to a reader’s cultural, political, and gendered identity” 
(176), and that the reader’s poetic identification and ethical judgment in 
reading the dramatic monologue might vary accordingly.
Furthermore, recent criticisms tend to focus on the performative as-
pect of the dramatic monologue as its key feature. Noting Langbaum 
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and his successors’ negligence in the “discursive, even conversational, 
nature” (68) of the genre, Cornelia Pearsall engages in the “performative 
element of the dramatic monologue, the methods by which these discur-
sive forays, these words, accomplish various goals—some apparent, oth-
er subtle and less readily perceptible” (67). For Pearsall, the dramatic 
monologue’s effects are far more complex than Langbaum’s dichotomy 
of sympathy and judgment. With its “assumption of rhetorical efficacy” 
(68), the dramatic monologue and its speakers strive for a “dramatic 
transformation of a situation or a self” (72). While Pearsall’s idea of the 
dramatic monologue’s performative effect focuses on the “substantive” 
effects and ends which the poem or the speaker, or even both of them, 
seek to produce within or without the text, E. Warwick Slinn offers an-
other perspective of reading the dramatic monologue as performative. 
Employing critical theories on performativity and “double operation of 
speech-acts as both descriptive and constitutive,” (5) Slinn explains the 
dramatic monologue as a linguistic process of the construction of the 
speaker’s identity within the cultural ideology. For Slinn, each speaker 
of the dramatic monologue is subject to his or her language, which is 
contingent on the historical context and the contemporary discourse. 
Thus, the dramatic monologue not only describes the speaker’s thoughts 
and situation but also constructs the speaker always in relation to the 
surrounding discourse system. In this process, the dramatic monologue 
serves as a cultural critique, “working from within established discur-
sive practices in order to expose their assumptions” (4): “These poems 
show how deliberately conceived performative language may focus cen-
tral cultural issues in an era, since, while determinedly tied to the terms 
of specific speech acts, their themes encompass several of the significant 
debates in mid-nineteenth-century England” (6). It might be helpful to 
compare Slinn’s view of the dramatic monologue with that of Glennis 
Byron published in the same year, who seems to share a surprisingly 
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similar perspective although put differently:
Context is crucial to the dramatic monologue as we now understand it 
since it is precisely the dynamic of self and context which reveals the 
fixed and essential self to be in fact fragmented, composite, and the 
product of a particular set of socio-cultural conditions. (84)
In her critique on the genre of the dramatic monologue, the combination 
made in the confrontation between “sympathy and judgment” as Lang-
baum analyzed as the key feature of the genre transforms into that be-
tween “self and context,” shifting the focus from the dynamics within the 
reader to that within the text and its contemporary cultural discourse.  
Byron’s revisionist approach on the dramatic monologue, as well as 
those of other critics mentioned above, has partly been made available 
because of the rediscovery of woman poets and the expansion of the 
canon in the genre. Once considered a “masculine” genre created and 
utilized by male poets such as Robert Browning and Tennyson, criticism 
of the dramatic monologue came to embrace broader and more complex 
discussions thanks to the rise of feminist criticism, rediscovery of wom-
an writers, and the widening of the canon. Before the major rediscovery 
of Victorian woman poets by gynocritics, Dorothy Mermin, maintaining 
that Victorian woman poets developed a different and separate poetic 
tradition from the “mainstream” tradition of Victorian poetry, observed 
that woman poets engaged in the form of dramatic monologue less than 
men, and if they did, the result was fundamentally different from men’s: 
“where men’s poems have two sharply differentiated figures—in dra-
matic monologues, the poet and the dramatized speaker—in women’s 
poems the two blur together. . . . the women’s dramatic monologues 
were expected to be, and were almost always perceived as being, univo-
cal” (76). For Mermin, in light of the frame of “sympathy and judgment,” 
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the dramatic monologues by Elizabeth Barrett Browning and Christina 
Rossetti were too sympathetic to the speaker to be considered effective. 
As more woman writers, such as Felicia Hemans, Augusta Webster, 
and Letitia Elizabeth Landon, were rediscovered and more feminist crit-
ics engaged in the issue, the discussion of the woman’s dramatic mono-
logue defied the stereotypical assumption of the genre as a “male” poetry 
and expanded a new prospect in the genre. Isobel Armstrong argues that 
the dramatic monologue was in fact an apt form for Victorian woman 
poets who questioned the social and literary norms and sought to “revo-
lutionise” (316) them from within, “to explore the way a female subject 
comes into being” (316). As mentioned above, Scheinberg problematizes 
the long-established frame of sympathy and judgment by criticizing the 
assumption of the male-centered readership as universal and points out 
the dangerousness of positioning women’s poetry as separate from the 
“mainstream” tradition, urging to take up the “challenge of rethinking 
generic definitions as well as discovering ‘lost’ women writers” (188) 
as doing so will allow us “to construct the Victorian woman poet as an 
agent of literary history” (188). In this context, Glennis Byron responds 
to and revises Mermin’s earlier observation of the woman’s dramatic 
monologue: if woman poets’ dramatic monologues generally sympathize 
more with the speaker than those of the male poets’, it is because “their 
target is more usually the systems that produce the speakers than 
the speakers themselves” (87). Similar to Slinn’s idea of the dramatic 
monologue as performativity and cultural critique, Byron argues that 
woman poets of the dramatic monologue “frequently exploit the strategy 
of inhabiting the conventional in order to expose it” (88). According to 
Byron’s view, as an interplay between the self and the context, woman’s 
dramatic monologue is specialized in critically exploring the relation-
ship between the speaker and the society: 
 The Dynamics of Oscillation between the Self and the Representation  87
The doubleness or discursive splitting that is considered characteris-
tic of the dramatic monologue is produced here not only through the 
split between poet and speaker but more importantly through the 
speaker’s internalisation of the ideology that defines her. (88)
As the dramatic monologue provides a “subjective account of her own sit-
uation” (88) which is “simultaneously offered to us for objective analysis” 
(88), it serves as “both a demonstration and a critique of the cultural 
conditions that have produced the speaker” (88), as an elaborate social 
commentary. By redefining the effect of the dramatic monologue as the 
interplay between the self and the context and analyzing woman poet’s 
dramatic monologue in this light, Byron legitimately establishes them 
within the tradition of the dramatic monologue, as well as expanding 
the literary potential of the genre itself.
Augusta Webster’s poetry is befitting to read in light of these revised 
perspectives on the genre of dramatic monologue. Webster, a passion-
ate advocate for women’s education and social activist in women’s suf-
fragist movement, wrote dramatic monologues with speakers both from 
mythical backgrounds and contemporary Victorian society. In tellingly 
named Portraits, she portrays monologues of female speakers who are 
inextricably related to, and keenly engages in, the contemporary Victo-
rian discourses on women. Byron’s and Slinn’s analysis of the dramatic 
monologue as a form interrogating the relationship between the self and 
the social discourse which serves as a social critique might be especially 
helpful in reading Webster’s dramatic monologues. One might raise 
concerns for reading Webster’s poetry with an assumption of a strong 
authorial presence as a female writer. Angela Leighton responds to this 
question in opposition to the idea of the “death of the author” that, in 
feminist criticism’s point of view, the “authority” of the female author, 
“far from having to die, has not yet been brought to life in the reader’s 
consciousness” (Victorian Women Poets 4): “To ignore the authorial name, 
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and all the historical and biographical information that goes with it, 
would be to lose, not only an already lost history of women’s writing, 
but also the rationale for writing about women poets at all” (4). Also, 
the historical and biographical background and the women’s poetry “are 
not necessarily either causally related or obviously compatible, but nei-
ther are they, therefore, totally unrelated and different” (4). In addition, 
Mary Poovey’s insightful analysis on the relationship between “women 
as historical agents . . . and woman—the historically specific representa-
tion of the female that mediates the relationship of women and men to 
every individual, concrete woman” (29) suggests we need not ignore the 
presence of the female author as a historical agent who reproduces and 
engages in the contemporary representations on women. In this view, 
considering the historical context in relation to the female author is fun-
damental to feminist literary criticism. Poovey argues that even though 
the dominant representation of women initially limits and contains the 
historical woman’s self-representation, the woman as historical agent 
might exceed it by elaborating its innate contradiction (43) by giving an 
example of the dominant discourse on prostitutes and the Contagious 
Diseases Acts in the 1840s, which is also an issue Augusta Webster’s 
poetry actively engages in. It might be said that the interactive relation-
ship between the historical agent and the discursive representation is 
precisely what is dramatized by Webster and her dramatic monologues. 
“The Happiest Girl in the World,” or, the Girl Who Does 
Not Know Herself
“The Happiest Girl in the World,” as the title alludes, is the mono-
logue of a bride-to-be who has been just engaged for a week. However, 
as the speaker avails herself of her betrothed’s absence, “almost glad 
/ To have him now gone” (7-8) to begin her monologue as the drama-
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tized form of her examination the inner self, the title soon proves to be 
deeply ironic: uncertain whether “if [hers] is love enough for him” (11), 
or whether she wants the marriage at all, the speaker is hardly the 
happiest girl in the world. Behind the marriage of the “happiest girl in 
the world” looms the anxiety of the redundant woman that dominated 
the contemporary Victorian middle-class discourse. As Sheila Jeffreys 
notes, “The 1851 census revealed that there were 405,000 more women 
than men in the population. They were described in the press as ‘excess’ 
or ‘surplus’ women and in the 1860s to 1880s the ‘problem’ of ‘surplus’ 
women caused great alarm amongst male commentators” (86). One of 
the most representative was W. R. Greg, whose comment on the issue is 
indicative of the nature of the contemporary discourse of the redundant 
woman:
. . . there is an enormous and increasing number of single women in 
the nation, a number quite disproportionate and quite abnormal; a 
number which, positively and relatively, is indicative of an unwhole-
some social state, and is both productive and prognostic of much 
wretchedness and wrong. There are hundreds of thousands of wom-
en—not to speak more largely still—scattered through all ranks, but 
proportionally most numerous in the middle and upper classes, who 
have to earn their own living, instead of spending and husbanding 
the earnings of men; who, not having the natural duties and labours 
of wives and mothers, have to carve out artificial and painfully-sought 
occupations for themselves; who, in place of completing, sweetening, 
and embellishing the existence of others, are compelled to lead an in-
dependent and incomplete existence of their own. (5)
Greg identifies the “disproportionate” and “abnormal” number of single 
women as mainly a middle- and upper-class issue that threatens the 
ideology of female domesticity. The idea of a huge number of respectable 
women who are bereft of the bliss of marriage and domestic life was dis-
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quieting for the contemporary Victorian society, whose ideology dictated 
that women should belong to the domestic sphere and be economically 
dependent on the husband. Women’s redundancy statistically indicated 
that a great number of women should be inevitably, structurally left 
out of the normative life cycles prescribed for them. Pauline Simonsen 
points out that the issue was primarily a bourgeois one concerning the 
fate of the middle class women who had little chance of economic in-
dependence, while “[t]he great majority of surplus women were work-
ing class, who could generally occupy positions as economic units more 
readily than their higher class sisters” (509). As a social construction, 
the discourse of the redundant woman, although originated from a sta-
tistical research, seems to have strengthened the middle-class domestic 
ideology rather than undermined it, since it consolidated the ideological 
normativity of marriage by arousing social anxiety with its deficiency.
It might be said, from a Foucauldian point of view, that it was the 
prevalent social discourse of the redundant woman which, in a way, 
actually constructed the social problem of redundancy and “produced” 
the redundant women in reality. As the social concern for spinsters who 
could not marry increased, the social significance of marriage for mid-
dle-class women inevitably increased. Despite the antithetical women’s 
movement of defying the domestic ideology (Jeffreys 87), the discourse 
of the redundant woman culturally endorsed women’s fear for not being 
chosen as well as gladness for being chosen by a man for marriage; it 
made the women immerse themselves in embodying and internalizing 
the ideological norms and representations on women in competition to 
each other, in order to be chosen as an ideal wife-to-be. In sum, the dis-
course of the redundant woman constructed the crisis of redundancy for 
the middle-class women as well as the female subjects who desperately 
embodied domestic ideals, ever narrowing the distance between the self 
and the discursive representation prescribed by the Victorian ideology. 
 The Dynamics of Oscillation between the Self and the Representation  91
This problem of the immeasurably close, perhaps even indistinguish-
able, distance between the self and the representation is what Webster’s 
bride-to-be in the “Happiest Girl in the World” is facing. 
The speaker in “The Happiest Girl in the World” is aware of the dis-
sonance between what she feels and what the society anticipates, or 
prescribes, her to feel. This awareness is characterized by her wish that 
she may “make myself believe it all is true” (12). In spite of the contem-
porary discourse of companionate marriage as an extension of romantic 
love, the speaker cannot be certain of her love towards her husband-
to-be; despite her engagement, she is “not so sad and not so gay” (17). 
As she searches for her moment of falling in love with her fiancé, the 
ensuing questions rhetorically support that she has had no definitive 
moment of falling in love with him: on the moment of the marriage 
proposition, she “did not think [she] could quite love him yet” (24). The 
questions about her love—“And did I love him then with all my heart?” 
(25), “And did I love him from the day we met?” (29), “And did I love him 
when he first came here?” (32)—indicate her uncertainty of her love. 
The question “When did I love him? How did it begin?” (35) is a crucial 
one that must be answered for her marriage, and one her betrothed has 
answered, too. Whereas the speaker is left to wonder “But how can I tell 
when my love began?” (42), her fiancé “knows when he loved [her]” (48), 
describing the exact moment that he decided to have her as wife. Faced 
with the anxiety that she cannot answer the fundamental question, 
thus the potential that she might not love him enough and be happy as 
anticipated, the speaker utilizes a defense mechanism that, although 
she cannot locate the exact moment she fell in love, she “should have 
answered ‘No’” (96) had her betrothed been impatient and made the 
proposition sooner. By being glad for his patience in waiting for her to 
be prepared for his proposition and supposing the situation where “I 
should have been startled and not known / How he is just the one man I 
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can love” (93-94), the speaker conversely assures herself that “he is just 
the one man I can love.”
However, the following imagery to demonstrate the necessity of her 
falling in love with him ironically implies the fact that her volition was 
irrelevant in the scenario of courtship and marriage. After mentioning 
her betrothed waiting for her to be prepared for the proposition, the 
speaker employs the imagery of nature to suggest both his patience and 
her necessary love for him:
  He waited as you wait the reddening fruit
Which helplessly is ripening on the tree,
And not because it tries or longs or wills,
Only because the sun will shine on it:
But he who waited was himself that sun. (100-04)
Here, the speaker utilizes the image of the “reddening fruit” just ripe 
for reciprocating love and accepting the proposition of marriage to dem-
onstrate her betrothed’s patience for her. As in her previous use of the 
imagery of the gradual transformations in nature to answer “When did 
I love him? How did it begin?” (35), such as “small green spikes of snow-
drops in the spring” (36), “June rosebuds” (39), and “young pale twilight 
star” (43), the ripening of the fruit is part of the transformations of 
nature which is inevitable and irreversible. The fruit will be ripe; the 
suitor will earn his reward for his patience. Does this “reddening fruit,” 
or a girl ripening for marriage, then, have her own volition in the act of 
being ripe? Such is the question the speaker, consciously or not, cannot 
help but raise while she expresses her gladness in her fiancé’s consider-
ate patience for her: without agency of its own, the fruit “helplessly is 
ripening on the tree, / . . . not because it tries or longs or wills, / Only be-
cause the sun will shine on it.” On the other hand, the speaker’s choice 
of words represents the sun as if it is willfully intent on ripening the 
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fruit. The natural laws dictate, in both senses of the word, that fruits 
ripen regardless of its intent. This imagery problematizes the speaker’s 
(presumed) love for her fiancé and consent to marriage because it im-
plies that her “ripeness,” for which her betrothed has been patiently 
waiting, has also been composed to the exclusion of her own agency in it.
This implication is all the more unsettling because in her case it is not 
the natural laws that have dictated her to be ready for marriage with a 
man: instead of the sun, a synecdoche for the laws of nature that ripens 
fruit, for the speaker, “he who waited was himself that sun.” It indicates 
it was the fiancé’s waiting presence that has made her, regardless of her 
intent, ready to marry him—even love him. The image of the sunshine 
upon the speaker, previously cited from the betrothed’s description of 
the moment he fell in love with her, tellingly resonates here with the 
speaker’s recognition that he himself has been the sun: “‘I see my wife; 
this is my wife who comes, / And seems to bear the sunlight on with 
her’” (63-64). The moment he sees her in the sunlight, he decides that 
he shall take her as wife, like the sun that “will shine on” the fruit for 
the inevitable moment of its full ripeness. In this analogy, the speaker’s 
development of love for her suitor and acceptance of proposition is natu-
ralized as something that happens both necessarily and spontaneously, 
circling her back to the unsolvable question of “When did I love him? 
How did it begin?” (35). 
However, the speaker is confronted by the doubt that her love falls 
short of what is anticipated from the bride-to-be, as the idea of a wom-
an’s love itself is constructed by conflicting but concurrent cultural dis-
courses. 
  Oh, was it worth the waiting? Was it worth?
For I am half afraid love is not love,
This love which only makes me rest in him
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And be so happy and so confident,
This love which makes me pray for longest days
That I may have them all to use for him,
This love which almost makes me yearn for pain
That I might have borne something for his sake,
This love which I call love, is less than love. (105-13) 
The speaker’s love for her betrothed is characterized by satisfaction in 
total dependence on her husband and self-sacrificial dedication toward 
him, which faithfully follows the Victorian domestic ideology of an obe-
dient, devotional “angel in the house.” As Patricia Rigg points out, the 
“the specific tropes through which the strong social subtext in this poem 
arises are those of the pastoral ideal—the simple purity of the word, 
thought, and feeling that assume contentment with one’s lot” (Julia 
Augusta Webster 130). However, the speaker feels “this love which I call 
love, is less than love,” since she feels that her love lacks crucial charac-
teristics prescribed for a woman soon to enter a companionate marriage:
Where are the fires and fevers and the pangs?
Where is the anguish of too much delight,
And the delirious madness at a kiss,
The flushing and the paling at a look,
And passionate ecstasy of meeting hands?
Where is the eager weariness at time
That will not bate a single measured hour
To speed to us the fair-off wedding-day? (114-21)
The speaker’s confusion on her feelings aggravates because the model 
of companionate marriage that supports the Victorian middle-class do-
mesticity requires her to embody conflicting ideals. On the one hand, 
the girl/bride/wife is an asexual, innocent, and infantilized figure “like 
a child” (122), but the cultural discourse on romantic love as a prerequi-
site for companionate marriage requires a more passionate form of love 
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that is essentially erotic in nature. Having internalized the norms of the 
domestic angel, the speaker has also educated herself of the prevalent 
cultural code of the romantic love as passionate yearning: she describes 
the element of romantic love which she lacks as “That subtle pain of 
exquisite excess, / That momentary infinite sharp joy, / I know by books 
but cannot teach my heart” (145-47). This ambivalent understanding of 
love of the speaker has caused the critics to split on the matter of the 
speaker’s sexuality. While Helen Luu reads the speaker’s lack of passion 
as Webster’s strategy of “enfreakment” that presents the unfeeling bride 
as grotesque and problematizes the “conventions of romantic love” (94), 
Rigg and Armstrong largely shares the idea that the speaker’s passion is 
thwarted by the ideology of women’s sexual innocence, whether the rea-
son is “her own perception of a wifely ideal” (Rigg, Julia Augusta Webster 
131) or the “thinness of the culture’s language of sexuality” (Armstrong 
365). 
However, the speaker’s psychology is much more complex than a mere 
dichotomy of the self and the social norms, whether the latter be that 
of sexual innocence or romantic love. The problem the speaker is faced 
with is that both are involved in the construction of her (a)sexuality. As 
the speaker cites the language of the romantic love, the originally pas-
toral and placid tone is uplifted in an ecstatic summons. It reveals that 
the speaker has been acutely anticipating the passionate emotions she 
is describing. Simultaneously, however, she acknowledges that she does 
not feel them for her betrothed. Her passionate yearning is not for her 
husband-to-be, but for the cultural ideal of the passionate love itself, re-
vealing that, as well as the ideal of the wife’s sexual innocence, the emo-
tion of passionate love is a social construct. Although the speaker fails 
to feel the latter for her fiancé, surrounded by the discourses on women 
entering marriage, she is still at once asexual and desirous. It is impos-
sible to distinguish which one of the two is the “real” speaker separate 
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from the discursive influence, let alone draw a clear line between the 
former and the latter. Because the seemingly incompatible two dis-
courses on women’s love construct the speaker’s emotion and (lack of) 
desire, she cannot decide whether she loves him or not. Adrift between 
the irreconcilable idea of love with “a child’s heart” (130) and that of “a 
woman’s” (131), she is left to doubt the adequacy of her love: “Alas am 
I too cold, am I too dull, / Can I not love him as another could?” (132-
33) Finally, she seeks comfort in defining her love in terms of her be-
trothed’s interpretation: “yet I think my love must needs be love, Since 
he can read me through” (148-49). Faced with the constant failure of 
determining her emotion in terms of her own feelings, her love is finally 
defined and prescribed by men’s understanding of the narrative of court-
ship and the male gaze.
Divided in an ambivalent position, the speaker is confronted with the 
problem of the impossibility of pinpointing her own emotions. She can 
assert neither love nor indifference toward her betrothed. In spite of her 
lack of passion, she is clearly fond of her fiancé, demonstrating the dis-
cursive representations of an ideal wife as she prays to be wholly depen-
dent to him, imagines to “Be flower and sweetness to him” (183), grow-
ing and nurturing in him, and desires to have him to herself. However, 
these feelings are always associated with violation or transgression of 
the form of love required of the bride. Like two sides of the same coin, 
the imagery of the “flower and sweetness” that “Grow, grow, and blos-
som out and fill the air, / Feed on his richness” (184-85) is the result of 
the “feathery wind-wasted seed” (170) being “thralled” (172) and “pris-
oned” (175) into a static life of marriage. Her desire to “be all for him” 
(241) is linked with her reluctance to bear children against the ideal of 
motherhood. Critics tend to focus on the speaker’s refusal of motherhood 
and interpret it as part of Webster’s social critique. Armstrong points 
out that the poem makes a “double critique,” (365) suggesting that “the 
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speaker is unable to admit to her lack of maternal feeling because the 
cultural pressure silences her—and she has also been too infantilized in 
preparation for being a child wife to be able to have maternal feelings” 
(365); Luu insists “Webster reveals the monstrosity of the ideal itself: 
it not only produces freak forms of femininity but also enfreaks the one 
form of femininity deemed to be the most natural for woman” (96).
As a demonstration of the speaker’s situation and the critique on 
the cultural ideology, “The Happiest Girl in the World” portrays both 
the divisions between the self and the ideology, and that between the 
split selves which have never been apart from the ideology. The divided 
speaker’s anxious ambivalence is epitomized in the line where she ac-
knowledges the ambivalence of her prospects of married life: “Yes, let 
me laugh a moment—maybe weep” (210), which soon develops into a 
negative form that cancels out the active reaction of either laughing or 
weeping:
  But no, but no, not laugh; for through my joy
I have been wise enough to know the while
Some tears and some long hours are in all lives,
In every promised land some thorn-plants grow,
Some tangling weeds as well as laden vines:
And no, not weep; for is not my land fair,
My land of promise flushed with fruit and bloom?
And who would weep for fear of scattered thorns?
And very thorns bear oftentimes sweet fruits. (211-19)
The speaker demonstrates her ambivalent position toward her immi-
nent marriage by refuting the positive prospective of her married life 
with the negative and refuting the negative with the positive. She repre-
sents her marriage as a “promised land” with “thorn-plants” among the 
flowers. The “joy” of “promised land” is canceled by the anticipation of 
the “thorn-plants” as she suspends her thoughts with the line “But no, 
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but no, not laugh,” while the gloomy vision of the “thorn-plants” is can-
celed out by the “land of promise” with “And no, not weep.” What started 
as an anxious, desperate attempt to comfort herself develops into an 
imagination that prevents her from either laughing or weeping. The 
speaker’s ambivalence toward her future, and her inner division, seems 
to conclude in a passive, weary state of standstill.
 
Webster’s Dramatic Monologue as a Social Critique
The “portrait” of “The Happiest Girl in the World” discloses the unset-
tling interplay between self and society, in which the self is never sepa-
rate from the ideological discourse even when it self-consciously seeks to 
be apart from it. The final “solution” the speaker employs is an attempt 
to suture the division by complying to the social norm; like a self-hyp-
notization or a performance of a self-fulfilling prophecy, the speaker re-
peats invoking her betrothed as in an incantation: “My love, my love, my 
love!” (195); “My love, my love, / I know it will be so” (226). However, as 
her affectation of indifference for her betrothed seem to fail at the end of 
the poem as her quiet rejoicing leaves her resolution unfinished—“And 
I will carelessly—Oh, his dear step— / He sees me, he is coming; my 
own love!” (265-66)—the speaker’s compliance to the social norm cannot 
guarantee her conscious inner self intact. Rigg observes that at the end 
of the poem the speaker comes to a full “awareness that the construction 
of herself as wife is at odds with an inner self who resists this construc-
tion” (“Augusta Webster” 90), and that she makes a conscious decision 
to imitate the norms anticipated of her, keeping her true inner feelings 
separate from the superficial conventionality:
Ultimately, this portrait takes its final from through the speaker’s 
sobering enactment of her own duplicity. She understands all too well 
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the images that conflate the happiest girl with the wife-to-be in order 
to suppress the true female subject. (Julia Augusta Webster 131-32)
However, what the inner plight of the “The Happiest Girl in the World” 
dramatizes is that, despite the dissonance which the self feels between 
herself and the discursive representation, there is no “inner self” nor 
“true female subject” to resist it or willfully embody it merely as an af-
fectation. Armstrong more aptly explains Webster’s description of the 
relationship between the female subject and the social discourse as fol-
lows:
Augusta Webster works through intensely analytical psychological 
exploration which discloses contradictions in the construction of fe-
male subjectivity. She is fascinated by those areas where we have no 
language or where language cannot exist in any richness, because of 
social constraints. (365)
“The Happiest Girl in the World” dramatizes an inner conflict of a bride-
to-be who feels happy and unhappy about her marriage at the same 
time. What complicates her issue is that the speaker, in her historically 
contingent surroundings, is contained by the discursive representation; 
and because she is contained by the representation, she cannot gain a 
clear apprehension of her “true” feelings over her own marriage. Oc-
casionally, in short moments, she discovers that she does not coincide 
with the representation prescribed by the society, but she cannot fully 
articulate her critical awareness as her language, modes of thoughts 
and of expressions, are, again, constructed within the containment and 
constraints of the social discourse that produces the female subject. 
The speaker, divided and ambivalent, oscillates between the discursive 
representation that reproduces her and the uncharted territory of the 
self-awareness of the dissonance from the discursive prescription. By 
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dramatizing the contradiction of the self, Webster enables a critical un-
derstanding of the relationship between the self and the society and the 
construction of the female subject.
Nevertheless, it would be misleading to read Webster’s dramatic 
monologues as pessimistic works that altogether deny the agency of 
their subjects. Webster develops her keen sense of social critique on 
the relationship between the self and the representation in her suc-
cessive poems in Portraits. The two poems after “The Happiest Girl in 
the World,” “A Castaway” and “Faded,” deals with the similar problem 
of female speakers deeply enmeshed in the contemporary Victorian 
discourse on women: “A Castaway” is a monologue of a prostitute who 
critically engages in the various discourse on the fallen woman, redun-
dant woman, and their socioeconomic conditions, while “Faded” is a 
monologue of an old spinster looking into a painting of her younger self, 
who criticizes the Victorian ideology that deprives women of their value 
and sense of self-worth once they get old. The speakers’ voice is much 
more intelligent and critical than the placid voice of the bride-to-be in 
“The Happiest Girl in the World.” As many critics have noted, in par-
ticular, Eulalie in “A Castaway” launches a series of eloquent attacks 
on the contemporary discourse of the prostitute as the “great social evil” 
epitomized by the Contagious Diseases Acts (Brown, “Economical Repre-
sentations”; Leighton, “Because men”; Walkowitz; Sutphin; Slinn), dem-
onstrating a clear self-awareness that defies an identification with the 
prevalent discursive representations on the fallen woman. Similarly, the 
spinster in “Faded” is well aware of the continuity between her younger 
self in the painting and her present old self, despite the ideology im-
posed upon women which puts a woman’s life apart according to the val-
ue attributed to their young age. However, both Eulalie and the spinster 
fail to separate themselves from the representations that finally contain 
them. As both poems examine the relationship between the self and the 
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cultural representation, the image of reflection is used as the key trope. 
Leighton insightfully argues that “The mirror of the external view” 
(Victorian Women Poets 190) is the key to Webster’s understanding of the 
womanhood as a discursive construction:
The mirror—that most female of Victorian images—gives Webster 
a figure for the social and ideological frames which trap women in 
conventional, incompatible pictures, but from which she also refuses 
to offer any introspective escape. . . . The self is thus presented as es-
sentially a creature mirrored in the looking-glass of society, and Web-
ster’s poems do not try to break that glass; they only set it at different 
angles. (186)
Leighton’s reading of the mirror greatly helps us to understand Web-
ster’s dramatic monologues in terms of the relationship between the self 
and the discursive representation. The image of the mirror as a reflec-
tion not of the inner self but the external ideology is extended to the 
painting in “Faded,” a cultural representation of a young woman frag-
mented from the woman’s real life. For both Eulalie and the spinster, all 
they can see in the reflection is the culturally constructed representa-
tion rather than their very selves, indicating the dangerous conflation 
between the self and the representation. However, what Webster finally 
dramatizes is the speakers’ keen awareness of the gap between the self 
and the reflection, the uncharted, irrepresentable territory of the female 
self that defies identification with the cultural prescription. Webster’s 
dramatic monologue demonstrates the subject not in terms of the “in-
ner self” which exists apart and opposed to the society, but as a social 
construction subject to the social discourse. However, Webster portrays 
a form of self-consciousness that perceives the production of the self 
and strives to remain in defiance to the representation that dictates the 
subject. Although she does not provide her speakers with any socioeco-
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nomic breakthrough, she tenaciously raises the issue of the interplay, 
and the distance, between the self and the social powers of discourse, 
and keeps the speakers in a persistent critical position that makes them 
question and problematize the relationship. The speakers’ dynamism of 
oscillation is what ultimately enables the compelling social critique of 
Webster’s dramatic monologue. Ultimately, as a performance, Webster’s 
dramatic monologue portrays the construction of the female subjectivity 
as the subject’s self-conscious oscillation between opposing and conform-
ing to the ideological representation—ever critically aware of the im-
measurably close, but not nonexistent, distance between herself and her 
reflection.
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ABSTRACT
The Dynamics of Oscillation between the 
Self and the Representation:
The Construction of Female Subjectivity in Augusta 
Webster’s Dramatic Monologue Form
Seonoh Kim
Recent criticism on the dramatic monologue has redefined the genre 
as a form of interrogation of the relationship between the self and the 
social discourse. In this revisionist approach, the (re)discovery of the 
women writers’ dramatic monologue has claimed a key position in de-
veloping critical discussion. Augusta Webster’s Portraits dramatizes its 
female speakers’ interplay with the contemporary Victorian ideology as 
they problematize the cultural representations of women. Whereas each 
speaker articulates her anxiety and frustration from the cultural dis-
course, she also delineates her susceptibility to the discursive represen-
tation as her speech betrays internalized sentiments and desires incul-
cated by the very social norms she strives to resist. “The Happiest Girl 
in the World” portrays the speaker’s ambivalent attitude toward her 
imminent marriage. The bride-to-be’s inadequacy and inability to artic-
ulate her feelings for her betrothed and marriage tellingly disclose the 
unsettling interplay between self and society, in which the self is never 
separate from the ideological discourse even when it self-consciously 
seeks to be apart from it. The speaker oscillates between the discursive 
representation that reproduces her and the uncharted territory of the 
self-aware dissonance from the discursive prescription. By dramatizing 
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the contradiction of the self, Webster enables a critical understanding of 
the construction of the female subject.
Key Words     Augusta Webster, dramatic monologue, Victorian women’s 
poetry, female subjectivity, female representation

